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1. Introduction  
In International Political Economy (IPE) scholarship, economic national-
ism (or neo-mercantilism) and neoliberalism are usually conceived as two opposite 
poles, with Marxism featuring as the third main theoretical tradition (Gilpin 1987). 
In particular when it comes to international trade, there is a clear-cut partition be-
tween neo-mercantilism and neoliberalism; if the first posits a conflictual and ‘zero-
sum game’ vision of international trade relations, the second, especially as theorized 
by liberal institutionalist theory (Oye 1986; Kehoane 1989), sees trade in light of a 
‘win-win’ approach and as the vehicle to attain international cooperation, peace and 
prosperity (more in paragraph 2). Read with these categories, the political economy 
of Trump administration appears to be a renewal of a neo-mercantilist spirit, which 
shows increasing distrust towards global trade and aims at the reindustrialization of 
the country. But are we really entering in a new mercantilist era? This study, depart-
ing from conventional IPE categories and analyzing jointly the foreign and domes-
tic political economy of Trump administration, put forward a more nuanced and 
dynamic vision of Trumpism as increased neoliberalization (Brenner et al. 2010) 
combined with economic nationalist elements at policy and discourse level. From 
this, it follows the definition of Trumpism as nationalist neoliberalism, conceived as a 
further evolution within the neoliberal order. The category of neoliberalism is used 
here heuristically to explain both the electoral success of Trump and the defining 
features of Trumpism, thus framing: (I) the historical phase of capitalism whose 
contradictions have been instrumentally and effectively exploited by Trump’s popu-
list rhetoric; (II) the ‘domestic side’ of the macroeconomic policy of Trump admin-
istration (see paragraph 4). On the other hand, the (re)introduction of the category 
of neo-mercantilism helps us to frame the economic nationalist elements of the US 
administration, concerning in particular international trade. 
The electoral success of Donald Trump occurred after several decades of 
trade liberalization, rampant social inequalities (Piketty 2014) and a widespread crisis 
of legitimation of the traditional political elites. Trump achieved to champion, 
through the use of the populist imaginary and rhetoric (Chako & Jayasurja 2017), a 
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part of US society increasingly marginalized and impoverished. The electoral cam-
paign was indeed centered on the ‘American worker’ and the reindustrialization of 
the country, winning support especially in those inner areas of the US exposed to 
international trade competition and severely hit by unemployment, loss of popula-
tion and economic crisis. Since the admission of China in the World Trade Organi-
zation, for instance, the trade deficit of the US grew from $83 billions to $370 bil-
lions, determining the loss of 7 million jobs in the manufacturing sector and leading 
employment to fall from 18.9 million jobs to 12.2 million (Munro 2016). 
The harmful effects of free trade agreements on a part of the US society 
partly explains the social origins of Trump election. According to a research by 
Autor et al. (2016) based on congressional elections from 2002 to 2010, there is an 
increasing political support to republican conservatives, and generally non-moderate 
politicians in areas exposed to deindustrialization, international trade and job losses, 
namely where local labor market features as the main driver of political polarization. 
More specifically, trade-exposed areas with a white population tend to replace dem-
ocrats or moderate republicans with conservative republicans, while areas with a 
minority-dominated population tend to vote to radical democrats or socialists. To a 
relevant extent, as noted by Mark Munro (2016), ‘The Rust Belt epicenter of the 
Trump electoral map says a lot about its emotional origins, but so do the facts of 
employment and productivity in US manufacturing industries’.1  
Therefore, the appeal to the ‘American worker’, reindustrialization and job 
creation, along with the condemnation of bad trade deals for the US, proved to be 
the key in order to win electoral support – as Trump's populist rhetoric was entirely 
addressed to the victims2 of the manufacturing crisis and the outsourcing of pro-
duction. Nonetheless, if this briefly sketched picture can be conceived as the general 
context in which the electoral success of Trump could take place, the question at 
stake is to understand to what extent the pro-worker rhetoric reflects an overall 
1 The Rust Belt is the chain of states from Great Lakes to Midwest, namely those states hit by dein-
dustrialization, increasing unemployment and loss of population: ‘Of the 10 states hardest hit by 
manufacturing jobs loss in that decade, eight of them went for Trump.’ (Alden 2017).  
2 See Samuels, 2017 for a Lacanian oriented analysis of the rise of conservatives and Donald Trump.  
49 
 
 
Interdisciplinary Political Studies, 4(1) 2018: 47-73, DOI: 10.1285/i20398573v4n1p47 
macroeconomic policy that really reverts the neoliberalization tendency of the last 
decades or, on the contrary, is just the ideological cover of the intensification of the 
neoliberal program with new features.  
In order to do so, the study takes into account the overall political econo-
my of Trump administration: on the one hand, the analysis zooms in on the ques-
tions of the renewal of the national interest through revising trade policy and trade 
agreements. On the other, the paper reviews the macroeconomic policy that emerg-
es from the budgetary documents for 2018 and the policy projections for the whole 
mandate. The aim is to reconstruct the foundational aspects of Trumpism combin-
ing these two perspectives. 
The paper is organized as follows: next paragraph discusses the conceptu-
alization of Trumpism as both economic nationalism and neoliberalization. The fol-
lowing two paragraphs (3 and 4) analyze the political economy of Trump admin-
istration with specific reference to trade policy and domestic macroeconomic policy 
documents. Eventually, the conclusion recaps the definitional features of Trumpism 
as militarist and economic-nationalist version of neoliberalism. 
 
2. Trumpism as combination of tougher neoliberalization and economic na-
tionalism  
Trumpism is conceptualized here as a combination of elements of eco-
nomic nationalism and increased neoliberalization. Rather than conceiving the two 
as opposite modalities of economic governance, I maintain that they are two inter-
twined segments of the current stage of the trajectory of neoliberalism as historical 
period. In other words, Trumpism displays at the same time an economic-
nationalist projection concerning international trade – in this case departing from 
the multilateral trade policy that has long dominated US trade agreements (contra, 
see Morrison 2017) – and a strengthening of the neoliberal-oriented macroeconom-
ic policy at the domestic level – in this case coherent with the last decades of US 
neoliberalization processes.  
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Let’s start from the neoliberal dimension. Neoliberalism is a historical 
phase of capitalism, an ideology, and a set of institutional and political processes 
aimed at strengthening and broadening the rule of capital, especially finance, 
through state power (Harvey 2005; Saad-Filho & Johnston 2005; Duménil & Lévy 
2011; Bruff 2014; Tansel 2017).  
In historical terms, neoliberalism arose from the crisis of the Keynesian 
mechanism of capital accumulation in the mid-1970s. The years 1978-80 were the 
turning point for the establishment of the neoliberal paradigm, with the US paving 
the way (Harvey 2005).3 The first key event in the rise of this macroeconomic para-
digm was the monetarist-oriented macroeconomic policy inaugurated by Paul 
Volker, head of the Federal Reserve, in 1979 (Saad-Filho 2010). Fighting inflation at 
the expenses of employment – which, consequently, started to decrease from that 
period – became the main policy target among central bankers. With regard to the 
political dimension, in 1979 Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister of the UK, 
and in 1980 Ronald Regan was elected as US President; both these governments 
pursued a fierce anti-labor policy and a market deregulation program, especially with 
respect to finance, with the objective of extending market mechanism to as many 
social sectors as possible – e.g. health, pension, public services and education – 
through privatization programs. In more theoretical terms, as Alfredo Saad-Filho 
put it, neoliberalism ‘combines an accumulation strategy, a form of regulation of so-
cio-economic reproduction and a mode of exploitation of and social domination 
based on the systematic use of state power to impose, under the ideological veil of 
non-intervention, a hegemonic project of recomposition of the rule of capital in 
each area of social life’ (2010, p. 100). 
The neoliberal phase of capitalism is historically characterized by two in-
terlinked global tendencies: the increasing power of finance and the rise of social 
3 Outside what is conventionally understood as the West, neoliberalism made its appearance after the 
Pinochet coup in Chile, which overthrew the legitimate and democratic government of Salvador Al-
lende in 1973. The Fascist regime of Pinochet, backed by the US, can be regarded as laboratory of 
intensive application of neoliberalizing policies. David Harvey interprets also the liberalizing policy 
under Deng Xiaoping in China, 1980, as neoliberal (2005, p. 1).  
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and economic inequalities, which affected the overall quality of democracy (inter alia 
see Solt 2008; Cole 2018). In regard to economic inequalities, Thomas Piketty has 
demonstrated that from the late 1970s and the 1980s there is an unprecedented ris-
ing of the top household income (2014, p. 48) and a growing gap between higher 
and lower incomes (see also Atkinson & Piketty 2010). In particular, Piketty stressed 
that when the annual average of yield based on income capital (profits, shares, rent, 
etc.) grows faster than the average growth rate of national income (r > g), we wit-
ness to the rising of income inequalities (2014, p. 680). In the US, for instance, after 
the equalitarian trend of the 1950s and 1960s, from 1977 to 2007 the richer 1 per-
cent of top incomes seized the 60 percent of the growth of national income, while 
‘the other’ 90 percent was left an average income growth rate of 0.5 percent per year 
(2014, p. 454; see also Duménil & Levy 2011). If capital income skyrocketed, wage 
incomes have been stagnating throughout the neo-liberal period. As matter of fact, 
from the same period real wages started to decline, along with the rise of the unem-
ployment rate, ‘with the vast majority of American workers experiencing wage stag-
nation while those at the top rung of the economic ladder reap the benefits of 
growth in productivity’ (McNicholas et al. 2017, p. 1). As reported by Andrew Glyn, 
‘US real wages at the bottom (first decile) did not grow at all between 1979 and 
2003’ (2006, p. 117), favoring the concentration of wealth in top incomes. In this 
regard, with respect to wage differentials ‘the median compensation of workers to 
the salaries of CEOs increased from just over 30 to 1 in 1970 to nearly 500 to 1 by 
2000’ (Harvey 2005, p. 16).  
A key feature of Trumpism concerns taxation. The policy objective is de-
creasing taxes to wealthy households, coherently with neo-liberal doctrines which 
postulate that this kind of tax policy triggers ‘trickle-down’ effects on the society as 
a whole through improving the spending and investing power of those who have 
the capacity to do it. The reality, however, is that tax reform, especially during the 
1980s, played a fundamental role in the increase of income gap and social inequali-
ties, as the taxation system is the hallmark to assess how progressive or regressive is 
the income distribution within a country. In this regard, from the early 1980s there 
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were several major reforms4 that modified the overall tax scheme and income dis-
tribution. Eight months after Ronald Regan became President, the Economic Re-
covery Tax Act (1981) dramatically lowered top incomes and corporate tax (Lynn 
1996, p. 95). Kasten et al. (1996, p. 29) reported that the high-income families in the 
top 1 percent of income distribution benefited the most from tax reforms of the 
1980s, due to the effective-tax-rate (ETR) decrease in absolute and relative terms. 
The reduction of taxation for top incomes augmented the level of income inequali-
ties, to the extent that ‘two-thirds of the absolute increase in the Gini coefficient be-
tween 1969 and 1989 occurred between 1980 and 1989. The rise of inequality [...] is 
further evidenced by a decline in the share of income received by the bottom three 
quintiles of families and a corresponding increase in the share going to the top two 
quintiles’ (Lynn 1996, p. 97-8; see also Saez & Piketty 2003; Atkinsons & Piketty 
2010, for more recent analyses of the trend).  
The analysis carried on so far should be integrated now with another cate-
gory, namely neo-mercantilism, in order to grasp the ruptures inaugurated by 
Trump administration with respect to trade policy, conceivable as the pivot of an 
economic nationalist agenda. It is worth stressing that economic nationalism is 
more than a policy: it is a mind-set based on a conflictual vision of international re-
lations and a political rhetoric. In this last regard, Donald Trump proved to be able 
to appeal to the ‘losers of globalization’ and to those left behind by international 
liberal trade regime policy in order to fuel consensus. Or, seen in another way, to 
portray the US as structurally harmed by international trade (more in section 3).  
In theoretical terms, economic nationalism – also labeled new protection-
ism, economic nationalism, statism (see Gilpin 1987, p. 31-34) – posits that increas-
ing the national volume of economic activity through the accumulation of wealth 
and resources is functional to the increase of the power of the state: wealth and 
power are the ultimate ends of state politics. The state is the main actor of the in-
ternational system, first because ‘States create the international social, political and 
4 In the 1980s there were five major reforms of tax policy: the Economic Recovery Tax Act (1981), 
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (1982), the Deficit Reduction Act (1984), the Tax Re-
form Act (1986), the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (1990) (see Kasten et al. 1996).  
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economic arrangements in order to advance particular sets of interests’ (1981, p. 
25); second, because the structure of the international system reflects the relative 
power distribution among dominant powers, so that the overall objective of the 
state is to preserve and/or increase its relative position in the global system charac-
terized by ‘a recurring struggle for wealth and power among independent actors in a 
state of anarchy’ (Gilpin 1981, p. 7; cf. Keohane 1984). In other words, economic 
nationalists conceive the increase of the relative share of wealth, influence and pow-
er of one state as correspondent to the relative decreasing of another state’s share. 
This perspective implies a conflictual view of international relations, rather than one 
based on the possibility of fruitful international cooperation like in the liberal 
institutionalist tradition (cf. Keohane & Nye 2012). As international relations are 
marked by endemic conflict, relative gains, insecurity and asymmetry, self-
sufficiency – rather than economic cooperation – is the main goal of state policy. 
The core of self-sufficiency is linked to another key element of economic national-
ism: industry. Industry is at the same time the vehicle to attain economic growth – 
and thus political strength – and, above all, to achieve self-sufficiency and reduce 
the pressure of external forces. Closely interlinked to the objective of re-
industrialization, protectionism is one of key strategies to protect domestic industry 
against the ‘invasion’ of foreign goods; neo-mercantilist governments thus ‘pursue 
protectionist and related policies to protect their nascent or declining industries and to 
safeguard domestic interests’ (Gilpin 1987, p. 33; emphasis added). As we will see in 
next section, Trump’s electoral campaign was based on the objective of the reindus-
trialization of the country and on the portraying the US as the looser of the global 
liberal trade regime; on the other hand, the first decisions of Trump administration 
concerning trade were based on the repeal of multilateral trade agreements in favor 
of a policy turning to bilateral agreements.  
Concluding, Trumpism can be conceptualized as the combination of ne-
oliberal macroeconomic domestic policy with neo-mercantilist elements concerning 
international trade, within an overall revanchist discursive strategy aimed at portraying 
the US as structurally harmed by the international liberal trade regime, in the at-
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tempt to ‘make America great again’ through a protectionist-oriented policy (Morri-
son 2017). After the conceptualization of Trumpism in general terms, the next two 
sections enquire the specificity of the political-economic strategy displayed by 
Trump administration in terms of trade policy and macroeconomic domestic policy.  
 
3. The first side of Trumpism: international trade relations 
International trade figured in the top priorities of Trump administration, 
especially due to the US current account deficit of $463 billion.5 ‘Horrible trade 
deals – Trump wrote in the Budget scheme of 2018 – from prior administrations 
have stripped wealth and Jobs from our Nation’.6 The first act of the White House, 
issued in January 2017, was pulling out the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TTP) negotiations.7 The move, symbolically relevant, has manifested the new 
course of the US trade policy and the unwillingness of the US to bear the costs of 
its global hegemonic position. Soon after the withdrawal from negotiations, the 
White House released three executive orders aimed at reviewing the question of 
foreign trade and trade deficit, and to relaunch the industrial base of the country.  
The first8 of these orders was issued on 31 March 2017. The President 
urged all the executive departments and agencies of the Country to prepare a report 
on: (I) the entity of trade deficits and the causes of trade deficits; (II) unequal bur-
dens and unfair discrimination against US commerce; (III) the effect of trade rela-
tionship on manufacturing and defense industrial base and (IV) wage growth and 
employment; (V) trade practices impairing national security. The second executive 
order9 strengthened the policy-making direction of the first. The aim was to protect 
5 Data in Scott, 2017b. 
6 US Government, Office of Management and Budget, 2017a. 
7 White House memorandum available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2017/01/23/presidential-memorandum-regarding-withdrawal-united-states-trans-pacific (ac-
cessed on 3 November 2017).  
8 See the Presidential Executive Order Regarding the Omnibus Report on Significant Trade Deficits, 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/31/presidential-executive-
order-regarding-omnibus-report-significant-trade (accessed on 3 November 2017).  
9 See the Presidential Executive on Establishing Enhanced Collection and Enforcement of Anti-
dumping and Countervailing Duties and Violations of Trade and Custom Laws, available at 
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the revenue of the US against dumping practices of importers. ‘As of May 2015, 
$2.3 billion in antidumping and countervailing duties remained uncollected [...] it is 
therefore the policy of the United States to impose appropriate bonding require-
ments, based on risk assessment, on entries of articles on entries of articles subject 
to antidumping and countervailing duties, when necessary to protect the revenue of 
the United States’ (ibid). In terms of policy implementation, this executive order 
urged all the executive agencies concerned, to develop a plan in order to cover im-
porters that put at risk the revenue of the US and to enforce antidumping and coun-
tervailing liability through appropriate legal measures. At the same time, it aimed to 
develop a strategy aimed at (I) combating violations of United States trade and cus-
toms laws for goods and for enabling interdiction and disposal, including methods 
other than seizure, of inadmissible merchandise entering through any mode of 
transportation; (II) ensure the timely and efficient enforcement of laws protecting 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) holders from the importation of counterfeit 
goods. Eventually, in terms of repression, high priority is given ‘to prosecuting sig-
nificant offenses related to violations of trade laws’.  
The third executive order is even more meaningful in terms of economic-
nationalism and neo-populist mind-set. It is meaningfully titled Buy American and 
Hire American.10 The order is particularly important as it covers several issues like in-
dustrial growth, trade relations, immigration, and protectionism for US goods. The 
aim of the order is ‘to promote economic and national security and to help stimu-
late economic growth, create good jobs at decent wages, strengthen our middle 
class, and support the American manufacturing and defense industrial bases’ 
through the maximization, by the executive branch, of the use of goods, products, 
and materials entirely produced in the United States. At the same time, ‘in order to cre-
ate higher wages and employment rates for workers in the United States, and to 
protect their economic interests, it shall be the policy of the executive branch to 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/31/presidential-executive-order-
establishing-enhanced-collection-and (accessed on 3 November 2017). 
10 See the Presidential Executive Order Buy American and Hire American, available at  
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/18/presidential-executive-order-buy-
american-and-hire-american (accessed on 3 November 2017). 
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rigorously enforce and administer the laws governing entry into the United States of 
workers from abroad’. In this last regard, there is a clean-cut relation between eco-
nomic interests and immigration policy. The ‘hire American’ policy is indeed related 
to the development of new rules and issue new guidance ‘to supersede or revise 
previous rules and guidance if appropriate, to protect the interests of United States 
workers in the administration of our immigration system’.  
From the three executive orders issued by Donald Trump emerges how 
trade is crucial in terms of reduction of trade deficit, protection of the industrial 
manufacturing and defense base, GDP and employment growth. Trump himself 
stated that ‘for most of our nation’s history [...] American presidents have under-
stood that in order to protect our economy and our security, we must protect our 
industry’ (Financial Times 2017). As noted earlier in the paragraph, the first action 
taken by the new President was to withdraw the US from TTP; afterwards, the 
North-Atlantic Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came also under fire, as Trump ex-
pressed several times the aim of revising the agreement, in particular to re-impose 
tariffs and review the ‘rules of origin’, namely the specification of whether, and to 
what extent, the components of a trade good belong to the US and/or the NAFTA 
area – in this regard, Chinese products would be particularly damaged. In this last 
regard, China is the main concern of the new administration in terms of interna-
tional trade relations. According to the estimations of the International Monetary 
Fund for 2015 (see World Economic Outlook database 2016), China has accumu-
lated a trade surplus of $600 billion, more than the half with the US.11 Trump, be-
sides accusing the Chinese to cheat with currency, namely to draw upon currency 
manipulation practices (BBC 2016), proposed to raise the tariff on Chinese imports 
to 45 percent.  
Many of the proposals, however, so far remained limited to circumscribed 
matters. In fact, a trade war in such an integrated world economy would definitely 
not be an easy task, especially after the massive outsourcing of the manufacturing 
11 According to the Foreign Trade Bureau, just in 2016 the trade deficit was $347 million. Data 
across many years available at https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html (accessed 
on 3 November 2017). 
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production of the past decades. China currently holds the leadership in the global 
production chain of the high-end technology products (e.g. computer industry, bio-
technology, aerospace and nuclear technology). According to a report by the Eco-
nomic Policy Institute,12 ‘in 2015, the United States had a $120.7 billion deficit in 
advanced technology products with China, and this deficit was responsible for 32.9 
percent of the total US-China goods trade deficit’ – with further harmful outcomes 
in terms of wage stagnation and job losses, quantified in 3.4 million from 2001 
(when China entered in the World Trade Organization) to 2005, 74.3 percent in 
manufacturing industry.  
It is worth stressing, moreover, that Trump administration did not show a 
repeal for trade as such: rather, these first few months of trade policy display a pref-
erence shift from multinational agreements to bilateral ones (Fabry 2017; see also 
Noland et al. 2017). This can be partly explained by Trump’s mind-set, character-
ized by an aggressive and leadership-oriented stance towards negotiations and 
agreements (see, for instance, Trump’s book The art of the deal; see also Capehart 
2015), to detriment of a cooperative and multilateral approach. In this regard, the 
Presidential memorandum of withdrawal from TTP (see fn. 8; emphasis added) also 
urged to ‘begin pursuing, wherever possible, bilateral trade negotiations to promote 
American industry, protect American workers, and raise American wages’. As noted 
by McNicholas et al. ‘as bilateral trade agreements are more likely to be ratified than 
multilateral ones, we are likely to see more trade agreements ratified as a result of 
the President’s directive’ (2017, p. 9-10; see also Chacko & Juayasurja 2017, p. 5).  
So far, the trade policy of the Trump administration has shown a neo-
mercantilist vision especially with respect to international treaties (TTP, NAFTA). 
On the other hand, (I) the strategy of pursuing bilateral agreements will likely be the 
direction of the economic-nationalist projection of Trumpism in the international 
level; (II) the tariff policy so far has been far less timid if compared to the usually 
much-vaunted statements of Donald Trump, and a trade war would actually harm 
the US first, given also the type of goods imported from China. According to the 
12 See Scott, 2017a. 
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analysis made by Noland et al. (2016, p. 26-34), a full trade war scenario with Mexi-
co and China – through raising the tariffs respectively to 35 percent and 35 percent 
on nonoil products – would led to inflation and stock market decline, in turn de-
termining a higher cost of debt and equity, economic depression and rising unem-
ployment up to 4.8 million jobs in the private sector.  
Concluding, the pathway of a neo-mercantilist vision concerning trade pol-
icy has been traced, and it is likely that will constitute the overall orientation of the 
future international trade agreements.13 It should be also noted that the great absent 
from Trump’s narrative are the US multinational corporations, which have largely 
benefited from the outsourcing of manufacturing production towards China and 
other developing countries. In this regard, the international trade policy of Trump 
administration is complemented by a strategy aimed at the repatriation of multina-
tional corporations via tax reduction, and boosting investments through a thorough 
supply-side pro-businesses macroeconomic policy. Next section zooms in on the 
domestic side of Trumpism.  
 
4. Budget cuts, welfare and tax reform, increases of defense expenditures: 
Trumpism as aggressive neoliberalism  
Recalling from the analysis of trade policy, employment and American 
working population appeared to be on top of Trump’s concerns (see the Buy Ameri-
can and Hire American executive order). To a relevant extent, the appeal to the im-
poverished (white) working and middle-class, along with the reindustrialization of 
the country was the key narrative of Trump’s winning electoral campaign. The ques-
tion, though, is to understand to what extent the first year of his mandate, and the 
macroeconomic policy projection in the near future, is coherent with a pro work-
ing-class politics or, on the contrary, can be conceived as the ideological cover of 
fiercer neoliberalization programs. In order to do so, this section analyses the budg-
13 According to Fabry (2017) there will likely be in the future two possible scenarios concerning 
trade: (I) an aggressive economic-nationalist agenda based on the repeal of international agreements 
and trade war, or (II) a protectionist policy with limited disruption, based on anti-dumping policies, 
and ad-hoc targeting of enterprises, and bilateral negotiations.  
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et documents for the year 2018 and beyond. Afterwards, the remaining sub-
paragraphs takes in specific account the welfare reform, the reform of taxation, and 
the labor policy. 
The Budget Document for the fiscal year 2018, titled A New Foundation For 
American Greatness (see fn. 7; see also the Budget blueprint America First. A Budget 
Blueprint to Make America Great Again), provides essential information in order to un-
derstand the overall political-economic address of Trump administration. The main 
aim of the Budget policy for 2018 is to balance the federal budget and boost eco-
nomic growth, given the growth of the government debt and a persistent stagnant 
economic situation. ‘The new Administration inherited an economic situation in 
which the United States is $20 trillion in debt and yet at the same time dramatically 
undeserving the needs of its citizens due to a broken, stagnant economy’ (Budget 
document, p. 8). Also productivity, the Trump administration laments, has achieved 
a historical low peak, averaging 0.5 percent from 2011 to 2016. The sources of the 
economic stagnation – worsened by the Great recession started in 2007-8 – are de-
tected in five main elements:  
(I) Unfair trade policies, which have determined trade deficits and stripped 
jobs and wealth;  
(II & III) Burdensome Federal regulations and Permitting process. Envi-
ronmental federal regulations (issued especially by independent agencies) and the 
general regulatory state are sources of added costs and a slowdown of business ac-
tivity. The same applies for Permitting process: major infrastructure projects have 
to pass through federal agencies for reviewing potential impacts on safety, security, 
community, and the environment. According to Trump administration, ‘the legal 
requirements and processes for the permitting and review of major infrastructures 
projects have developed a siloed and ad-hoc way’, delaying the timing of approval 
of the projects.  
(IV & V) Business tax and low business investment. According to the new 
administration, corporate tax in the US is the highest in the OECD countries, with a 
tax rate of 38.9 percent against the average 24.7 percent in the OECD (though, the 
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weighted average to GDP is 31.39 percent14). Especially due to the differentials in 
corporate taxes with developing countries, ‘businesses will have the incentive to lo-
cate overseas’ (Budget document, p. 7), thus determining a steady decreasing of 
business investments.  
The outline of the sources of poor growth and job losses allows us to get 
to the core of Trump’s economic vision, unsurprisingly aggressively committed to-
wards business and market. Burdensome constraints to business activity and corpo-
rations – whether in terms of excess of regulations or corporate tax – along with 
bad trade deals, are identified as the key problems of the US economy, to be adjust-
ed through a supply-side oriented agenda. More specifically, the economic policy 
outlined by Trump administration can be conceived as a mix of budget cuts, welfare 
state reform and deregulation – indeed, the only sector benefited from spending in-
creases is defense policy.  
Following a clear-cut neoliberalizing program, the main aim of the Budget 
document and the related Major Savings and Reforms document15 is to reduce the 
global role of the government through a program of budgetary cuts and reduction 
of social welfare, namely ‘an aggressive set of program elimination, reduction, and 
saving proposals that redefine the proper role of the Federal Government’ (New 
Foundations, p. 12). Along with spending reduction, moreover, Trump administra-
tion planned also to reduce the civilian workforce employed in the federal govern-
ment, to reform agencies and federal programs, and to reform public employment 
through the introduction of managerial criteria (New Foundations, p. 14).  
With specific respect to budgetary policy, the Document plans a reduction 
of federal spending equaling $3.6 trillion – aiming to achieve the balanced budget in 
ten years. According to the Major Savings document, in 2018 the spending reduction 
equals to $57.3 billion cuts in discretionary programs ($26.7 billions in program 
elimination and $30.6 billions of reductions). Importantly, the only sector con-
cerned by increases in spending is defense, as the Budget Blueprint included a $54 
14 See Pomerleau and Potoski, 2016. 
15 US Government, Office of Management and Budget, 2017b. 
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billion increases for 2018, compensated by the spending reduction in non-defense 
programs (New Foundations, p. 12). In terms of federal programs elimination, the 
sectors mostly concerned (millions of $) are Education ($4.976), Health and Human 
Services ($4.834) and Housing and Urban Development ($4.123). With respect to 
discretionary reductions (millions of $), the sectors hit by budget cuts are State and 
USAID ($10.674), Health and Human Services ($6.720), Education ($1.527), Ener-
gy ($2.154), Housing and Urban Development ($2.042), Transportation ($1.733), 
Labor ($1.419) and Environmental Protection Agency ($1.175).  
This overview of the general budgetary policy and the vision underpinning 
the role of the government with respect to social programs, defense policy and 
business activity aims at laying emphasis on the aggressive neo-liberal agenda put 
forward by Trump administration. In order to close the circle, the next sub-
paragraphs zoom in on the welfare reform, tax reform and labor policy.  
 
4.1. Welfare reform and the repeal of Medicaid program 
Many social welfare programs are planned to be reduced or eliminated due 
to the spending cuts planned by Trump administration in the years to come. Partic-
ularly concerned by budgetary reduction is the Health and Human Services sector, a 
key segment of the reform of welfare policy. For instance, the budget blueprint for 
2018 stipulates the elimination of programs and agencies such as the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, the Community Services Block Grant, the Low 
Income Home Energy. Spending reductions concern also the National Institute of 
Health Topline, the Food and Drug Administration Medical Product User Fees, the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the Child Support Enforce-
ment Program and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. Medicaid, the 
healthcare reform issued by Obama administration that has extended the health in-
surance program, has been cut off along with a number of other federal health pro-
grams like Medicare, Exchange subsidies, the Federal Employee Health Benefits 
Program. The aim of the repeal of Medicaid is ‘to create a free and open healthcare 
market’ and ‘to empower States to make decisions that work best for their markets’ 
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(New Foundations, p. 9), earning savings equal to $70.000 millions between 2018-
2021 and $610.000 millions between 2018 and 2027.  
The welfare policy reform is likewise important in order to shed light on 
Trump’s vision of social relations. To a relevant extent, Trump administration con-
sider those living on welfare programs as ‘dependent on the Government’ (New 
Foundations, p. 10; emphasis added), so that through tightening the requirements 
of the eligibility to welfare programs, people are forcibly pushed to return to the job 
market again. More specifically, Trump administration proposals entail a series of 
reforms to tightening the eligibility for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Pro-
gram, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Child Tax Credit (CTC). Moreo-
ver, the reform provides also for the introduction of the Social Security Number 
valid for work in order to claim for the EITC and the CTC. In relation to this last 
welfare program, the current law stipulates that also individuals without the CTC 
are entitled to such benefit, whereas under the proposed reform just those who are 
authorized to work in the US can claim for EITC and CTC. The reform of disability 
programs also follows a similar rationale, namely the reduction of the overall social 
spending and promotion of the labor force participation of disabled people, intro-
ducing ‘new program rules and require mandatory participation by program appli-
cants and beneficiaries’ (New Foundations, p. 11). In quantitative terms, the federal 
government has imposed mandatory savings proposals for Disability Programs 
equal to $8.839 millions between 2018 and 2022 and to $72.454 million until 2027.  
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4.2. Increasing the income gap: tax reform scheme 
 
A New Foundation for American Greatness requires a new approach to how we tax, regulate, 
and support American worker and job creators (New Foundation for American Greatness, p. 6) 
 
As already mentioned in this section, the main economic problem detected 
by Trump administration is the excess of burdensome taxation – on corporations 
and personal incomes – and regulation, which constraint business activities and 
prosperity. Generally, despite the rhetoric about the ‘American worker’, the tax re-
form policy of Trump administration is a new and fiercer step in the direction of an 
overall taxation scheme that increasingly favors top incomes – given also that the 
projected modification of the overall tax revenue is linked with the reduction of ex-
penditures concerning welfare programs as Medicare and Medicaid.  
The vision of the White House with respect to taxation is that a ‘compre-
hensive overhaul to our tax code will boost economic growth and investment’ (New 
Foundations, p. 13), creating also new jobs. In other words, the strategy for eco-
nomic growth and job creation passes through the liberation of the forces of capital. 
At the same time, the aim of the administration is to make the US ‘a more attractive 
business environment’ (ibid), through a fiscal dumping strategy aimed at bringing 
back corporations and high incomes – in this case, the proposal is favoring the re-
patriation of profits made overseas by multinational corporations without penalties 
or additional taxes. Among the tax reform proposals for instance, there is the end of 
the minimum tax, the repeal of the 3.8 percent Obamacare surcharge on capital 
gains and dividends, and the abolition of death tax. The reform scheme passes thus 
through three main policy instruments: (I) the reduction of the tax rate on business-
es; (II) the elimination of the special interest tax break to lower the tax rates for 
businesses; (III) the repatriation of the overseas profits without incurring additional 
taxes (New Foundations, 2017, p. 14).  
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Specifically, the proposed reform of the taxation structure as emerged by 
the joint work of the White House and the Senate Financial Committee16 provides a 
new taxation scheme for individual incomes and corporations. With respect to indi-
vidual incomes, the current system is made of seven rates and income thresholds 
(adjusted on single filer, joint filers or head of household). The proposed restructur-
ing of the tax scheme, likewise grounded on a structure of seven thresholds, delivers 
an overall reshuffle/diminution of the structure of the rates (see Table 1). With re-
spect to corporations, the reform (among other provisions) lowers the corporate in-
come tax from the current 35 percent rate to 20 percent from 2019; eliminates the 
alternative minimum tax; enacts deemed repatriation of currently deferred foreign 
profits, at a rate of 10 percent for cash and cash-equivalent profits and 5 percent for 
reinvested foreign earnings (Walczak and El-Sibaie, 2017).  
 
Table 1 - Projected Tax Reform of Trump Administration 
Current tax rates for head of 
household 
Tax rates for head of household 
after 2018 Reform 
10 % not over 13.350 10% not over &13.600 
15% = $13.350 to $50.800 12% = $13.600 to $51.800 
25% = $50.800 to $131.200 22.5% = $51.800 to $60.000 
28% = $131.200 to $212.500 25% = $60.000 to $170.000 
33% = $212.500 to $426.700 32.5% = $170.000 to $200.000 
35% = $426.700 to $444.550 35% = $200.000 to $500.000 
39.6% over $444.550 38.5% over $500.000 
Source: Senate Financial Committee. Available at https://www.finance.senate.gov/taxreform 
 
The new reform, at the same time, doubles the estate tax exemption from 
$5.6 million to $11.2 million; increases the standard deduction to $12.000 for single 
filers to $18.000 for heads of households and to $24.000 for joint filers; eliminates 
16 See in particular the bill Tax Cuts and Jobs Act released by the Senate Financial Committee, 10 No-
vember 2017.  
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the additional standard deduction and the personal exemption. According to calcu-
lations, the tax reform would allow to $1.5 trillion tax cut over 10 years (New York 
Times, 10 September 2017), that is to say reducing further the federal budget and 
likely increasing the government debt. Above all, as stated by Jacob Kirkeegard 
(2017), the tax reform will render the US tax system, already one of the more re-
gressive among OECD countries, even more regressive, therefore increasing in-
come inequalities.  
 
4.3. Working-class rhetoric and anti-labor policy reality  
As noted earlier in this section, the Department of Labor (DOL) suffered 
from $1.419 million budget cuts, and several agencies and programs were hit by 
spending reductions or program elimination.17 Despite the political emphasis on the 
‘American worker’ outlined in the trade policy, the budget blueprint for 2018 pro-
vides for the elimination of the DOL’s international labor grants and the reduction 
of the Bureau of International Labor Affair, which ensures that trade agreements 
are fair for US workers (see Major Savings and Reform, p. 60). In terms of program’s 
elimination, the Unemployment Insurance Solvency Standard was suppressed in or-
der to burden the States alone for the funding of the unemployment insurance. 
Trump urged the DOL to review also the Fiduciary Duty Rule, aimed at improving 
the workers’ rights to be informed when financial advisers are paid a commission to 
steer clients towards specific investments – namely, when there is a conflict of in-
terests. With respect to regulations, the new administration blocked the Fair Pay 
and Safe Workplaces Rule. As stated by McNicholas et al. (2017, p. 3)  
 
The rule required companies applying for federal contracts to disclose violations of federal labor laws 
and executive orders addressing wage and hour, safety and health, collective bargaining, family medi-
cal leave, and civil rights protections. Currently, there is no effective system for distinguishing between 
law-abiding contractors and those that violate labor and employment laws.  
 
17 For a thorough reconstruction of the first months of Trump’s labour policy, see in particular 
McNicholas et al 2017.  
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Trump administration blocked also a DOL resolution assisting the Indi-
vidual Retirement Account (IRA), a retirement scheme set-up by local government 
for private-sectors workers when employers do not offer a workplace retirement 
plan. The IRA plan provides workers with the automatic enrolment and deduction 
in retirement schemes administered by local government. In terms of workplace 
safety, the White House delayed the effective date of a rule aimed at limiting the 
workers’ exposure to beryllium in the workplace, one limiting the permissible expo-
sure to crystalline silica in the construction industry, and another aimed at protect-
ing miners’ safety and health. Eventually, Trump administration blocked also the 
resolution Workplace Injury and Illness Recordkeeping rule, aimed at improving the 
employers’ obligations to keep records of workplace injuries and illness (ibid, p. 4), 
and proposed a rule (5 December 2017) to allow employers to legally pocket work-
ers’ tips for estimated $5.8 billion (see Shierholz et al. 2017).  
 
5. Conclusion: Trumpism, senile disorder18 of neoliberalism?  
The analysis made in the previous sections has sought to shed light on the 
contradictory core of the political economy of Trump administration by looking at 
the overall picture and taking into account the budget policy, taxation and welfare 
reform, as well as at the international economic relations and defense policy. The 
first side of Trumpism can be conceived as the strengthening of the neoliberal 
pathway: the macroeconomic strategy to boost economic growth and employment 
is thoroughly committed to a supply-side oriented policy made of tax cuts on cor-
porations and top incomes, and on the reduction of regulations for business activi-
ty. The plunge of taxes – a proper fiscal dumping strategy, given the extent of the 
cuts (see paragraph 4.2) – is also conceived as the necessary step to repatriate profits 
made above by multinational corporations. In the same direction, the budgetary 
documents and the spending decisions reveal the effort to reduce dramatically the 
role of the government in terms of expenditures for welfare and other sectors, e.g. 
18 The quote is adapted from a polemical pamphlet by Lenin, Left-wing Communism: an Infantile Disor-
der.  
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education, health system, environment, employment insurance. The strengthening 
of the neoliberalization process concerns also the budgetary and welfare policy, in 
particular due to the reduction of budgetary expenditures for welfare programs and 
agencies, and to the negative vision associated to welfare as such.  
If the role of the government with respect to wealth redistribution, educa-
tion and welfare is shrinking in terms of spending magnitudes, on the side of trade 
and defense it is moving towards an increasing nationalist and militarist orientation. 
In fact, the second side of Trumpism concerns the international economy and the 
defense policy, two aspects of Trump’s redefinition of the national interest. If from 
the 1930s the US national interest was linked to a liberal international rule-based 
order, this belief has been actually reverted with Trump administration. As seen in 
paragraph 2, the trade policy inaugurated by the White House is based on a 
conflictual and zero-sum game vision of the international trade. This does not im-
ply, however, a total repeal of trade, also due to the potential cost of a trade war. 
Rather, this belligerent stance will be likely translated in the prevalence of bilateral 
trade agreements fast-tracked19 by the White House, and an increasing unwillingness 
to bear the costs of the US (post?) global hegemonic role. The economic national-
ism is part of a broader strategy in which the military and defense also have a prom-
inent role. In this regard, the Trump administration has diverted to this sector $54 
billions from non-defense spending, stressing the role of military defense of US 
borders and promising also ‘a focus on overt power through the expansion of the 
navy in the Asia-Pacific’ (Chacko & Juayasurja 2017, p. 5).  
Coming to the conclusions, in theoretical terms, the article has sought to 
use IPE categories dynamically, employing them to shed light on Trump administra-
tion political economy in the making and to stress its intrinsic contradictions. From 
the empirical analysis, Trumpism emerges as a combination of longstanding pat-
terns of supply-side and pro-business oriented macroeconomic policy and welfare 
state retrenchment, with a neo-mercantilist trade policy and belligerent militarism. 
19 The ‘fast-track’ is a procedure aimed at speeding-up the approval of bills concerning trade agree-
ments through cutting down debate and/or filibuster, amendments, and other special procedures 
(Shapiro 2006).  
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So far, it is hardly to speak about a renewed ‘military Keynesianism’ (cf. Chacko & 
Juayasurja 2017): rather, it seems to be the dawn of a military and economic-
nationalist neoliberalism. This implies that the shift towards a nationalist-oriented 
discourse and policy can be compatible, as seen for instance with respect to taxation 
and fiscal policy, with the trends that have characterized the neoliberalizing patterns 
over the past decades. On the global side, the US will be likely unwilling to bear the 
costs of the international liberal trade regime as emerged in the post-WWII era, 
possibly rewriting, in the forthcoming years, the international rules concerning trade 
agreements and commercial relations – that is to say, a foundational aspect of global 
politics.  
However, Trumpism is characterized by another and deeper contradiction: 
it is a populist capitalization of the structural contradictions of neoliberalism and of 
the crisis of legitimation of the traditional political elites, and, at the same time, a 
strengthening of those (neoliberal) patterns which have determined economic im-
balances and social unrest – yet, intertwined with new nationalist elements. This oc-
curs, moreover, within an international order increasingly characterized by systemic 
instabilities. As such, rather than leading the US away from the current political and 
social crisis while providing also a source of stability for the architecture of the in-
ternational order, the Trump administration will likely exacerbate and accelerate the 
manifold crises of our time.  
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